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7 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination

THRU: CIA Top Secret Control Officer
Chief, General Services

25X1A9a FROM: [REDACTED] Organization and Methods Examiner
SUBJECT: Report on ORR Area Top Secret Control Office and
Sub-Station

1. Title of Station: Office of Research and Reports Area
Top Secret Control Office.

25X1A9a 2. Area TS Control
Officer [REDACTED]

a. Area Alternate TS Control Officers:

[REDACTED] Incoming
- Outgoing
Cosmic only

b. Cartographic Branch Sub-Station:

25X1A9a [REDACTED]

3. Inclusive Survey Dates: 6-7 March 1952.

4. Obvious Departures from Basic Agency System:

a. Documents from outside agencies are handcarried from Central
TS CO to ORR immediately upon receipt for scanning and determination
of ORR quantity requirements prior to routine processing and repro-
duction. Liaison Division, CD determines other CIA dissemination
requirements. In the interest of speed, uniformity, and elimination
of preferential treatment, Liaison Division should be furnished with
a guide to ORR requirements and establish dissemination patterns in
the routine manner. This is especially important inasmuch as Liaison
Division is moving to Riverside Stadium and the inconveniences inherent
in the present arrangement will be more acute.

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b. The Alternate Area TSCO [REDACTED] reads each document received and disseminates the document within ORR on the basis of "need to know". In most cases, the Chief of the Office performs this function. If the present arrangement is to continue, the examiner feels that [REDACTED], who presently shares an office with four persons not dealing with Top Secret material, should be moved into a room devoted exclusively to Top Secret documents.

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c. Outgoing documents are channelled through an alternate TSCO in an office separate from that of the Alternate TSCO receiving incoming documents. Incoming and outgoing logs are separate and are not compared for purposes of follow-up by either of the Alternate TSCO's.

d. D-2 (Strategic Division) uses an internal buck slip (see Exhibit A) in addition to green cover sheet. This practice was developed when D-2 for security reasons was not permitted to indicate internal distribution on cover sheets. Since D-2 is now permitted to use green cover sheets for distribution, the buck slip should be eliminated.

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e. D-B (Basic Division) very rarely issued a section of an NIS that is classified Top Secret (one to my knowledge in over a year). Any TS section is sent direct from Basic Division to Reproduction in Alexandria, by-passing the Area TSCO, the reason being that Basic is located in [REDACTED]. Also, a TS section of an NIS is not given a CIA control number until it is sent from Reproduction to Central Top Secret Control. The examiner recommends that ORR should be instructed to arrange for transmission of TS sections of an NIS to Reproduction via the ORR Area TSCO, who, in turn, would obtain the CIA control number from CTSC. CTSC would prepare a Posting Record for suspense until the reproduced TS section is returned for dissemination.

5. Security Hazards:

a. Receipt, reading and distribution of Top Secret documents in a room occupied in addition to the alternate TSCO by four persons not dealing with Top Secret material.

b. Transporting of weekly TS logs from Sub-Stations by the regular system for Secret and below. The examiner believes that the TS log, since it contains the full titles of Top Secret documents and their disposition, should be transmitted between buildings through the Officer Courier system. However, the green cover sheet could be dispensed with.

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c. The Area TSCO should maintain an up-to-date list of all persons receiving and transmitting TS documents through the lowest echelon. He should also maintain an up-to-date list of all ORR personnel authorized to see Top Secret material, as the examiner has been advised that some CIA employees are only cleared through Secret. These lists should be circulated to ORR Division Chiefs and any changes formalized by memoranda to Divisions.

d. When a lengthy TS documents contains only a small amount of material of interest to an analyst, he extracts the pertinent information for his personal file. The Division Assistant TSCO should be notified and a Division control of the extract established. This could take the form of a Division log showing the CIA document number - extract (621440 - Ext.), material extracted (pages 7 through 10), where extract filed, and signature of analyst.

e. Bindings of TS documents are not sufficiently secure. Frequent handling results in pages being torn completely away and lost, or mutilated beyond usefulness. It is suggested that a tough backing sheet be added to each document that is not bound at the time of reproduction which would protect the document from mutilation. Also, the document should be stapled all the way across the top or down the side rather than one in the left corner.

f. Industrial Division (D-I) does not obtain signatures when documents are released internally.

6. Unique Problems:

a. AD/RR consists of individuals who work with the higher echelons and, in the pressure of work, receive and issue documents outside control channels. The Division Assistant TSCO is alert to this problem and copes with it in so far as possible. The examiner has no solution to offer at this point.

b. D-G/C (Cartographic Division) Sub-Station has the problem of transmission and storage of large maps (up to 9 x 15 ft.) of TS classification. A TSC sub-station was established in D-G/C to handle this unique problem and seems to be operating quite satisfactorily.

7. General Remarks

Each Division in ORR was visited with the Area Alternate Top Secret Control Officer, and the procedures, forms and filing systems inspected.

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The visit was welcomed in each instance, and the personnel were anxious to cooperate in offering suggestions and in presenting their problems for solution. The examiner believes that a detailed procedures manual and periodic visits by members of CTSC would be useful and appreciated by the various Areas.

The examiner will retain the detailed notes made on the exact method of operation in each Division in the event a more exhaustive report is desired, and for use in standardizing methods Agency-wide at conclusion of the overall survey.

8. Recommendations for Improvement and Commendation:

a. Improvement:

(1) ORR should cooperate with Liaison Division in establishing a guide to analysts in determining ORR's requirements in dissemination of documents, in order to eliminate the present practice outlined in 4.a, above.

(2) ORR's Area outgoing and incoming logs should be combined and handled by one person. Further, a "flag" system should be established to follow-up on documents which are to be expedited to other CIA Offices.

(3) D-2's use of a buck slip in addition to the green cover sheet should be eliminated.

(4) D-3 should channel all TS material through the Area TSCO for transmission outside ORR.

(5) The CIA green cover sheet should be revised to allow more space in the "Seen By" column. This could be accomplished by making two columns out of the present "Seen By" column, thus doubling signature space.

(6) Area Alternate TSCO should set up a suspense system to follow up on ORR numbers issued by telephone to Divisions. At present, when information is received from the Division as to subject, etc., the number is entered in red on the weekly log (to distinguish it as originated by ORR). The suspense system could be instituted simply by immediate entry in red on the log of the number assigned and a notation in pencil as to the person to whom the number was issued. Daily follow-up should be made on all red numbers on which full information has not been received. It should be stated here that, thus far, Divisions have been prompt in furnishing [redacted] with the required information but a suspense system would insure that, in future, no oversight would permit the possibility of the same number being issued twice or no document developing from issuance of a number.

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b. Commendation:

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(1) The Area Alternate TESCO [REDACTED] has devised an internal log form to be used in all ORR Divisions (see Exhibit B) which the examiner considers an excellent record for Divisions with numerous internal routings. It is believed that this form or an adaptation can be used by other CIA offices having numerous internal routings.

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(2) [REDACTED] system of entering ORR originated documents in the log in red is considered an excellent method for other Areas.

(3) ORR uses a "deadline" tag on documents to be expedited which is adaptable.

(4) ORR is to be commended for the general excellence of its Top Secret Control system -- with the few suggested revisions. The cooperativeness of the personnel and their interest in improvement are also to be commended.

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